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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
MERVIN J. RUSSELL,
Deceased.
Case No. P-86-052
GEORGIA J. RUSSELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 90-0184
(Priority No. 16)

GENE J. RUSSELL, GENIAL P.
RUSSELL, ADA J. RUSSELL and
HELEN RUSSELL GREEN,
Defendants.
Case No. 87-208
ADA J. RUSSELL, HENEN J.
RUSSELL, GENE RUSSELL and
GENEIL RUSSELL, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GEORGIA J. RUSSELL,
Defendant.
Case No. 87-213
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(j) and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUES
1.

Whether the appeal should be dismissed.

2.

Whether the court below required Mr. Allred to

stipulate to the testimony of his questioned documents examiner.

3.

Whether the stipulation as given to the jury was

error, and if so, whether it was harmless error.
4.

Whether Appellants failed to preserve the issue of

standard of proof for appeal.
5.

Whether the standard of proof on the issue of undue

influence is by clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance
of the evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1. The legal sufficiency of a Notice of Appeal is
determined by the court as a matter of law and is rooted in the
proposition, M[T]he initial inquiry of any court should always be
to

determine

jurisdiction.

whether
When

the
the

requested
matter

is

action
outside

is
of

within

its

the

court's

jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss."

Varian-

Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Allred v. Allred, 807 P.2d 350 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reed v. Reed,
806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991).
Issue 2.

"In reviewing evidentiary rulings made under

Rule 403, we will not overturn a trial court absent and abuse of
discretion, (citing Cases)

To constitute an abuse of discretion,

the error must have been harmful."

State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415

(Utah 1989) .
Issue 3. The Standard of Review is the same as Issue 2.,
supra.
Issue 4. "An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury
instruction presents a question of law only.
2

Therefore, we grant

no particular deference to the trial court's ruling."

Ramon v.

Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gene J.

Russell, as Petitioner, initiated

a Formal

Testacy Proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-3-401 in the
Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, Case No. P-86-052
challenging the validity of the will of Mervin J. Russell dated
November 9, 1983 and an Agreement Cancelling Antenuptial Agreement
executed by Mervin J. Russell and Georgia J. Russell dated August
14, 1982 on the grounds of Mervin J. Russell's lack of testamentary
capacity, duress and undue influence (R. 1-12).

The challenged

documents were later expanded to include an Agreement Cancelling
Antenuptial Agreement executed by Mervin J. Russell and Georgia J.
Russell dated January 25, 1983 and a Quit Claim Deed executed by
Mervin J. Russell and Georgia J. Russell dated June 25, 1982 which
documents were challenged on the same grounds (R. 563-567).
Georgia J. Russell, as Petitioner, initiated an Informal
Probate Proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Part 3, §75-3-301
through 11, in the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County,
Case No. P-86-061 seeking to probate the will of Mervin J. Russell
dated November 9, 1983 (R. 27-29; R. 843, T. 672-674).
Because of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §75-3-401(3)
the Informal Probate Proceedings relating to the will were deferred
until the disposition of the Formal Testacy Proceeding P-86-052 (R.
27-29) .

3

Georgia J, Russell, as Plaintiff, brought an action for
Partition and to Quiet Title to the Mervin J. Russell estate
against Gene J, Russell, Geneil P. Russell, Ada J. Russell and
Helen Russell Green as Defendants in the District Court of Tooele
County, Case No. 87-208.

Ada J. Russell, Helen J. Russell, Gene

Russell and Geneil Russell, as Plaintiffs, brought an action
against Georgia J. Russell, as Defendant, for Partition and to
Quiet Title to the Mervin J. Russell estate in the District Court
of Tooele County, Case No. 87-213 (R. 839, T. 1-7).
The final resolution of both the actions for Partition
and to Quiet Title depend on the final disposition of Case No. P86-052 relating to the will, the two different executions of the
Agreement Cancelling Antenuptial Agreement and the Quit Claim Deed
(R. 839, T. 6,7; R. 724).
The trial of P-86-052 was held on May 22-25 and 30, 1989
in the District Court of Tooele County, the Honorable

Scott

Daniels, Trial Judge, which resulted in a Judgment on the Verdict
entered on June 15, 1989 which was favorable to Appellee (R. 618622).

Gene J. Russell filed various post-trial motions pursuant

to Rule 52(b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (R.630-650)
which motions after argument and submission to the court, were
denied

(R. 723-725).

The second Judgment on the Verdict also

favorable to Appellee was entered on March 7, 1990 (R. 726-738).
(Addendum 1)

4

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee generally agrees with the Statement of Facts in
Appellants' brief but feels it necessary to inform the court of the
following supplemental facts.
At the time Georgia

Russell

signed

the Antenuptial

Agreement she owned with her brother a ranch at the mouth of Ophir
Canyon consisting of 131 acres, cattle and sheep, two tractors,
bailer, mower, plows, disk, two flatbed trucks, and was employed
full-time at the Tooele Army Depot South Area (R. 837, T. 4-6)..
On May 3, 1976, Ada Russell, mother of Gene J. Russell,
and former wife of Mervin J. Russell, executed a Quit Claim Deed
in favor of Gene J. Russell and Geniel, his wife, to the one-half
of the property formerly owned by Ada Russell jointly with Mervin
J. Russell (R. 842, T. 399, 400; Exhibit 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Notice of Appeal is defective in that it does

not specify a party taking the appeal who has the legal right to
appeal and it does not identify the judgment appealed from.

The

appeal is also taken from an Order Denying the Motion for A New
Trial which cannot be done.
2.

Appellants'

attorney,

Mr.

Allred,

voluntarily

stipulated to the testimony of his questioned documents examiner
being read as stipulated to the jury.

The colloquy between court

and counsel as set forth in the brief and Addendum 2 shows the
voluntary nature of the stipulation.

5

3.

Assuming the stipulation as read to the jury was

error, it was harmless error as ruled on specifically by the court•
The harmless error is also demonstrated in the colloquy between
court and counsel in the brief and was additionally rendered
harmless by the findings in the jury verdict (Addendum 1).
4.

Appellants failed to submit a proper request for a

jury instruction on the standard of proof or undue influence being
by a preponderance of the evidence and the issue of standard of
proof for undue influence has not been preserved for appeal.
5.

It has always been the judicial policy in the State

of Utah as announced in the decided cases to uphold wills against
claims of fraud and undue influence by requiring substantial proof
of undue influence.

Substantial proof is clear and convincing

evidence in that clear and convincing evidence is defined as there
is no serious or substantial doubt as to the issue involved.
Decided cases provide a clear guide to bench and bar in determining
testamentary

capacity, mental capacity to execute a deed and

standard of proof for fraud and undue influence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO CONFER
JURISDICTION ON THE COURT TO HEAR THIS APPEAL.
Notice of Appeal was filed and served on April 6, 1990
(R. 826-827).

Appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal with

memorandum in this Court on May 10, 1990. A reply memorandum was

6

filed by the appealing party on May 20, 1990 together with a Motion
to Clarify Pleadings which reads as follows:
The Appellants above-named and Gene J. Russell,
Petitioner, in the event that there exists some
confusion as to the Pleadings herein, request
leave of Court to alter said Pleadings to
Clarify said Pleadings by inserting after the
word Plaintiffs, the word "Petitioner" in the
Notice of Appeal and adding to said Notice that
the Judgment being Appealed from was entered
March 7, 1990.
WHEREFORE, Appellants pray that the Court
allows such clerical corrections as are
necessary under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Thus, the Motion to Clarify Pleadings is actually a
Motion to Amend the Notice of Appeal by adding "Petitioner" to
"Plaintiffs" as appealing parties and designating the judgment
appealed.
The Motion to Clarify Pleadings was never brought on for
hearing before the Court.
A. The Notice of Appeal does not specify parties capable
of taking an appeal.
Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P., provides in part as follows:
The notice of appeal shall specify the party
or parties taking the appeal.
The Notice of Appeal provides as follows:
The Plaintiffs above-named and each of them
hereby Appeal from the Judgement [sic] on the
Verdict [sic] and Order denying the Motion for
New Trial; said appeal is taken from the Third
District Court in and for Tooele, State of Utah
and appealed to the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah.

7

The judgments entered on June 16, 1989 and March 7, 1990
show that it was entered in Case No. P-86-052 wherein Gene J.
Russell was the Petitioner (R. 618-632, 726-738).

The Motion to

Alter or Amend the Judgment, Motion for New Trial and the Order
Denying the Motion for New Trial all show the papers were prepared
and filed in P-86-052 (R. 633-635; 639-650; 723-725).
It should be noted that Gene J. Russell and Helen J.
Russell are Plaintiffs in 87-213 and Georgia J. Russell is a
Plaintiff in 87-208, the Partition and Quiet Title actions.

It

should be further noted that the caption in the upper left of the
front page of the Notice of Appeal identifying the appealing
attorney shows Mr. Allred as "Attorney for Petition [sic] Gene
Russell" (R. 827).
Paragraph numbered 4 on Page 2 of the Order Denying the
Motion for New Trial provides that:
4.
The partition claims are stayed until the
completion of the appellate process or the
running of the time for appeal without an
appeal being taken. (R. 724)
The Partition claims refer to Case Nos. 87-208 and 87-213 (R. 844,
T. 719, 720).
Research fails to disclose a Utah case on the proper
designation of parties in a Notice of Appeal. In the case of Hayes
v. Haqemeier, 75 N.M.

70, 400 P.2d

945

(1963) co-plaintiffs

purported to appeal an adverse judgment to the New Mexico Supreme
Court.

The court ruled as follows at 400 P.2d 946:
A question is presented at the outset as to
whether Betty Evans perfected an appeal. Both
the motion and order granting appeal were in
8

the singular. The notice only named Carolyn
as the appellee. This court has a duty to
determine whether it has jurisdiction of an
appeal. . . .The record fails to disclose a timely
appeal by Betty Evans.
The same case before the Court of Appeals of Kansas and
the Kansas Supreme Court illustrate the two views regarding the
proper designation of parties in a Notice of Appeal.

In Brueck v.

Krinqs, 631 P.2d 1233 (Kan. App. 1981), the Kansas Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal and held as follows at 631 P.2d 1236:
Appellants contend that this statute should
not be strictly applied to bar their appeal.
However, appellate jurisdiction is conferred
by statute and in the absence of compliance
with statutory rules an appeal should be
dismissed....Moreover,
(citing
case) our
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a
party who was not named in the notice of
appeal, either directly or by inference, could
still be regarded as an appellant. The federal
courts have similarly ruled, noting that only
the parties named in the notice of appeal are
brought
within
the
appellate
courtfs
jurisdiction.
In an appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals was reversed in Brueck v. Krinqs, 638 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1982)
and the Kansas Supreme Court ruled as follows at 638 P.2d 906:
Notice of appeal is governed by K.S.A. 602103, which section provides in part:
11

(b) The notice of appeal shall specify
the parties taking the appeal....
That section must be read in the light of
K.S.A. 60-102, which provides:
"The provisions of this act shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding."

9

The latter section was intended to be applied
to the entire Code of Civil Procedure,
including K.S.A. 60-2103....
•

*

*

We hold that the notice was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the appellate courts,
and we conclude that the appeal should not be
dismissed.
K.S.A. 60-102 is the same as Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is not included in the Utah R. App. P.
However, this court dismissed the appeal in the case of
Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d
798 (1964) with the following language at 388 P.2d 800:
....the object of a notice of appeal is to
advise the opposite party that an appeal has
been taken from a specific judgment in a
particular case. Respondent is entitled to
know specifically which judgment is being
appealed.
The language of the Nunley case, supra, should be equally
applicable to the designation of the "party or parties taking the
appeal."

Form 1 of the Utah R. App. P., provides with respect to

the designation of parties as follows:
Notice is hereby given that [plaintiff]
[defendant]
and
appellant,
name
...appeals to the Utah...
This appeal was taken by "Plaintiffs" of which Appellee
Georgia J. Russell is one in Case No. 87-208. No "plaintiffs" have
an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court and the Notice of Appeal is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court to hear the same.
B.

The Notice of Appeal

fails to designate which

judgment on the verdict is being appealed.
10

There are two judgments the verdict in Case No. P-86052, to wit: The one entered on June 16, 1989 and the one entered
on March 7, 1990.

Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P. further provides in

part:
The notice of appeal...shall designate the
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed
from...
Form 1, Utah R. App. P., provides:
...appeals...the final [judgment] [order] of
the Honorable
(name)
entered in this
matter on

(date)

.

"Plaintiffs" have failed to designate which judgment is
being appealed or the date of the entry of the judgment being
appealed.

The language of Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.,

supra, is directly applicable to this deficiency in the Notice of
Appeal on file herein.
Rule 3(d), Utah R. App. P. does not require the inclusion
of the name of counsel for the appealing party or for the matter
the name of the trial judge as court probably refers to the
specific district court.

Form 1, R. of App. P., apparently

requires the inclusion of the name of the appealing attorney, trial
judge and the date of the entry of the judgment which items are not
included in the Notice of Appeal on file herein.
C.

An appeal cannot be taken from an Order Denying a

Motion for a New Trial.
"Plaintiffs" include in the Notice of Appeal that they
are appealing the "Order Denying the Motion for New Trial."

11

In Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 7 Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972
(1966) this court ruled, under former Rules 59(a)(4) and 72(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the material portion of Rule 72(a)
being represented in Rule 3(a), Utah R. App. P., as follows at 409
P.2d 973:
This appeal is abortive, being from the denial
of a motion for a new trial.
The appeal should be dismissed.
POINT II
MR. ALLRED VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO THE STIPULATION RELATING
TO THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF HIS WITNESS.
The Appellantfs brief states at page 15,

!f

...the court

abused its discretion when it forced the contestant [appellant] to
stipulate away its right to present testimony."

And at page 16,

"Contestants [appellants'] counsel objected to being forced into
any stipulation regarding his expert's testimony...."
Although

Appellants'

counsel,

Mr.

Allred,

stated

preliminary and rhetorically, "I don't think I should be in a
position where I am forced into a stipulation." (R. 835, T. 9 ) , he
nevertheless agreed to the stipulation as given to the jury (R.
835, T. 12-15).
The following is the sequence of events regarding the
stipulation proceedings as set forth in the record:
MR. ABLES: Your Honor, may be approach the
bench for a minute?
THE COURT:

Certainly.
(Conference at bench.)
12

THE COURT: This is going to take a little
longer than I thought. We are going to excuse
the jury for a new minutes while we work
something out here.
Will you take them in the jury room or somewhere, Mr.
Gochis? We will proceed with this matter.
(Jury exits the courtroom.)
(The transcript of the stipulation
proceedings was previously transcribed
and can be found in a separate volume.)
(R. 840, T. 152, 153)
The entire

stipulation proceedings

held out of the

hearing of the jury are included as Addendum 2 (R. 835, T. 3-15).
The stipulation was formulated at (R. 835, T. 4-12, Ln. 14), and
restated and agreed to at (R. 835, T. 12, Ln. 15-15) as follows:
Will you stipulate to all of that, Mr. Abies?
MR. ABLES: May I hear it one more time? I
think it is brief, I believe.
THE COURT: Okay. In November of 1988 — this
witness examined some documents in November of
1988. She gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that
the August 14th document was not signed by
Mervin Russell in her opinion. Secondly, that
it was signed by some other person attempting
to disguise their own handwriting. That on May
11th or 12th of 1989 she came to the conclusion
and indicated to Mr. Allred that the person who
had signed it was Georgia Russell.
And
secondly that there are two other documents
which she looked at, one dated January 12th,
1984 -- exhibit what? Do you know?
*

ic

-k

THE COURT:
what?

And January 26, '87 document is

MR. ALLRED:

Yes.

That's 60.

THE COURT: 60? Those documents were signed - were -- were to signed by Mervin Russell but
13

in her opinion they were not signed by someone
attempting to disguise their handwriting.
MR, ABLES:

That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Let's call the jury back in.

The jury was brought back into the courtroom and the
following took place:
THE COURT: The record will show that all the
members of the jury are in their places. We
talked to the lawyers while you where [sic] out
and they have come to sort of a stipulations
which is sometimes stated during the course of
trial. To save time, the lawyers will agree
that certain testimony, certain ones who
testify in certain ways, they just agree so
there is no disputing the witness. So that's
the case here; they have agreed to certain
facts and you are to take these facts and
assume them to be correct.
Therefore, the
witness won't have to testify.
You will see in evidence a document which is
dated August 14, 198__ — what is it dated?
MR ALLRED:

'2.

It is an unnotarized agreement canceling the
antenuptial, Exhibit Number -THE COURT:
MR. ALLRED:

What is the exhibit number?
Number 30.

THE COURT: It is an agreement canceling the
antenuptial agreement.
MR. ALLRED:

Number 30, yes.

THE COURT: The document examiner will testify
that she examined that document, along with
other sample signatures, and came to the
conclusion that the document was not signed by
Merv Russell; that is, that his name was not
signed by him, that it was in fact signed by
someone who was attempting to disguise their
own handwriting. She came to that conclusion
and gave her opinion to Mr. Allred in November
of 1988.
14

Later, on May 11th or 12th, just 10 or 11 days
ago, she came to the further conclusion that
the person who had signed that document was
Georgia Russell. She gave that opinion to Mr.
Allred at that time.
She would also testify that two other
documents, one dated January 12, 1984 and one
dated January 26, 1987, which will be marked
Exhibit 57-A and Exhibit 60, were also not
signed by Merv Russell, but the person who
signed his name on those documents was not in
any way attempting to disguise their own
signature.
I believe that is the extent of
stipulation; is that right, Mr. Allred.
•

*

the

*

THE COURT: The lawyers agree that would be
this witness's testimony if she continued to
testify, and based upon that, the witness has
been excused.
Are you ready to call your next witness, Mr.
Allred?
MR. ALLRED: Yes, we would call Helen Russell
at this time.
There is not one iota of evidence in these stipulation
proceedings to support the claim of Mr. Allred that he "stipulated
away" his "right to present testimony" or was "forced into any
stipulation

regarding

his

expertfs

testimony."

Mr.

Allred

voluntarily stipulated to the testimony of Christine Thornburry as.
formulated above being presented to the jury.
None of the cases cited in support of the idea Mr. Allred
was forced into a stipulation are applicable. What is applicable,
are the cases of Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); and Richins v.
15

Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.# 817 P.2d 832 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
wherein stipulating parties became unhappy about their stipulations
voluntarily entered into and tried unsuccessfully to avoid the
consequences of the same.
It should

also be noted

that Mr. Allred

failed to

specifically object to the trial court that he had been forced to
stipulate his right away to present testimony or that he was forced
to entered into the stipulation he entered into so the trial court
could make a ruling as to the voluntariliness of the stipulation.
When Mr. Allred brought the matter back before the court
at (R. 842, T. 432-439) his only concern was that the stipulation
given to the jury was not correct and had nothing to do this his
being forced into the stipulation or waiving his right to present
testimony.
There is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate
that Mr. Allred's stipulation was anything but voluntary.
POINT III
THE STIPULATION READ TO THE JURY WAS WHAT WAS STIPULATED
TO BY COUNSEL AND IF ERROR, WAS HARMLESS ERROR.
The whole purpose of having the conference out of the
hearing of the jury relating to the testify of Christine Thornburry
was to present to the jury what she would testify to if questions
relating to the signature on the unnotarized Cancellation of
Antenuptial Agreement (Exhibit 30) dated August 14, 1982.
highlights of the stipulation as formulated are as follows:
THE COURT: Hold on a second. She is going to
testify that the August 14th document was not
16

The

signed by Mer Russell; that it was signed by
someone who was attempting to disguise their
own handwriting; and the other documents are
just comparison documents which she used to
make this conclusion? (R. 835, T. 3, Ln. 25,
Ln. 1-5)
THE COURT: Hold on. Now are you going to
-- Mr. Abies, are you going to contest either
to those two facts: Either that this document
of August 14th was not signed by Merv Russell
or that it was signed by someone attempting to
disguise their own handwriting?
MR. ABLES: It was signed by Georgia Russell
on August 14th, we stipulate to that. And I
think that question of disguising, I don't
think that's relevant at all. She had admitted
she signed it. (R. 835, T. 4, Ln. 23-25, T.
5, Ln. 1-6)
THE COURT: It is relevant. My question is do
you agree to it? It is clearly relevant. She
is going to say looks like someone disguising
their handwriting. There is no question it is
relevant. If your objection is relevancy I
will overrule that objection.
If you will
stipulate to that, then she doesn't need to
testify. So you just say and we can get on
with it. (R. 835, T. 5, Ln. 19-25)
I just need to know whether you agree to it,
Mr. Abies.
MR. ABLES:
that.

All right.

We will stipulate to

THE COURT: What we are going to tell the jury,
then, is that you will agree that she examined
the documents. When? (R. 835, T. 6, Ln. 914)
THE COURT:
At that time she gave you her
conclusions, which are that, number one, the
August 14th signature of Mer Russell was not
written by him; and secondly, that in her
opinion it was written by someone attempting
to disguise their own handwriting.
MR. ABLES: That's right.
23-25, T. 7, Ln. 1-3)
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(R. 835, T. 6, Ln.

Will you stipulate to all of that, Mr. Abies?
MR. ABLES: May I hear it one more time?
think it is brief, I believe.

I

THE COURT: Okay. In November of 1988 — this
witness examined some documents in November of
1988. She gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that
the August 14th document was not signed by
Mervin Russell in her opinion. Secondly, that
it was signed by some other person attempting
to disguise their own handwriting. That on
May 11th or 12th of 1989 she came to the
conclusion and indicated to Mr. Allred that
the person who had signed it was Georgia
Russell. And secondly that there are two other
documents which she looked at, one dated
January 12th, 1984 -- exhibit what? Do you
know? (R. 835, T. 12, Ln. 15-25, T. 13, Ln.
1-3)
•

*

•

THE COURT: 60? Those documents were signed - were -- were not signed by Mervin Russell but
in her opinion they were not signed by someone
attempting to disguise their handwriting.
MR. ABLES:

That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Let's call the jury back in.

MR. ABLES: In addition to that we stipulated
-- we did stipulate in addition to the opinion
of the examiner -- we stipulated that Mrs.
Russell signed the document dated August 14th
of 1982, whatever number it bears, and also
she signed exhibits 57 and 60.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ALLRED: I don't think that should be part
of the stipulation. I think it should show
that they are stipulating to the testimony as
accurate, and not get in there to start out
making their excuses.
THE COURT:

I guess that's right.

MR. ABLES: We aren't going to enter testimony

18

MR. ALLRED: I am sure you are going to.
have got all that right.

You

THE COURT: You can put that in. That's not
part of this witness's testimony. (R. 835, T.
13, Ln. 20-25, T. 14, Ln. 1-16)
After the stipulation was given by the trial court to the
jury (R. 840, T. 153, 154), supra Point II, the following occurred:
MR. ALLRED: I think their agreement was they
admitted she signed it, admitted it was
disguised.
MR. ABLES:

No, we didn't do that.

THE COURT:

Wait a minute.

MR. ABLES:

Absolutely not.

THE COURT:

That was the agreement.

MR. ABLES:

No, it wasn't.

THE COURT: I think — just a minute. Approach
the bench, please.
(A side bar conference was held.)
THE COURT: The lawyers agree that would be
this witness's testimony if she continued to
testify, and based upon that, the witness has
been excused.
Are you ready to call your next witness, Mr.
Allred?
MR. ALLRED: Yes, we would call Helen Russell
at this time. (R. 840, T. 155, Ln. 1-17)
Appellee's attorney stipulated to the proposed testimony
of Christine Thornburry as set forth above and was willing to
stipulate to the fact that Georgia Russell had executed Exhibit 30,
but not to the fact that Georgia Russell, according to Christine
Thornburry, attempted to disguise her handwriting.
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Assuming,

arguendo, that the stipulation given by the trial court to the jury
was in error, it was harmless error for the following reasons:
1.

Mr. Allred brought the matter up again at (R. 842,

T. 432-439) and even confused the trial court into thinking that
Mr. Abies stipulated that Georgia Russell had attempted to disguise
her handwriting (R. 842, T. 436).

The trial court solved the

problem by making the following ruling at (R. 842, T. 438, 439):
THE COURT: Well, I admit to having made an
error in this situation, but I think it is a
small one and I don't think it takes a lot to
-- I think it is fairly harmless.
I don't
think it takes a lot to solve the problem. I
think we will leave the stipulation as it is
with the understanding that Mr. Abies is not
going to ask questions that would allow Mrs.
Russell to deny that she disguised the
handwriting.
Then you
testimony
disguised
ever deny
that will
2.

can argue to the jury we have this
from the examiner, that it was
and it is unrefuted, that she didn't
it. And I think if you can do that,
solve the problem.

Instruction 36 to the jury provided:

You are instructed that Georgia J. Russell's
signature of Mervin J. Russell's name to the
Cancellation of Antenuptial Agreement dated
August 14, 1982 [Exhibit 30] was proper if she
signed it in his presence and by his direction
(R. 574).
The

jury

found

in

its

special

verdict

that

the

Cancellation of Antenuptial Agreement of August 14, 1982 (Exhibit
30) was signed by Georgia J. Russell in the presence of Mervin J.
Russell and at his direction (R. 566). The jury's finding was made
in spite of the unrefuted stipulated testimony that Georgia Russell
attempted to disguise her handwriting and it is to be seriously
20

d o u b t FM1 f h a l
Russell

if

Hi

Abies

til ILj.iiipl. i-fi I I

stipulate^

Iihtjiii ii In'i

^nraia

liiimii

and weight necessary to compel an opposite

finding.

I
August

,1 A

ly .

i n v a ] :i d b y
capac:ii t }

it.-i.t^j m i n e d

t h e r e a s o i 1 11 i. a t M e r v i n J

:: -i i i ' i ig u s I: 11 I
I

The

Ill 9 82: (1 1

.

. -

* *-

I I u s s e 11 l a c k e d t e s t a m e i I t a r y

565) .

C a n c e l lata on

of

Antenuptial

Agreement

dated

w a. s a in o o t i s s u e b y v i r t u e o f 11 I e v a 1 i d i t y o f 11 I e w i ] ] o f M e r v i n
J

R u s s e l ] a s f o u n d b*y 1:1 le ji ii : y :li i i :l t s s p e c i a ] verd i ct ( R

56 7)

ri le sti pi :i ] ati oi l t J as « c 1 I in: I tari ] } agr e e d I: ::: I: "\ I Ii:

A ] ] i: ed

and w a s a c c u r a t e l y g i v e n to the jury and i f t h e r e w a s e r r o r i i I the
s u b s t a n c e of t h e stipulation., i t w a s 1 larmless e r r o r .
POINl iv
APPELLANTS

FAILED

TO

PROPER!.'?

I'HKIJKHVK

THE 1SSUE

OF

S TANDARD OF PR Z C f FOF I! PE "E I i I • .
I n s t r u c t i o n ] 4 "was a g e n e r i c i n s t r u c t i o n on p r e p o n d e r a n c e
c f e v i d e n c e g i v e n ^ v the trial c o u r t
AppeJ ] ai its • (R

requested

by

5 16 )

Instructor

generic

instruct io;

ear

-.nci

. jellee
I n s : ruii i -

;a rrs.'-r.

A p p e j i a n c s m a y n a \ e opjectea orally
21

* .roof - : standard

t

-- » g i v i n g

i -

if i? r.f

jorr . jn

relating to the proof of undue influence by clear and convincing
evidence, they failed to submit a written request for a standard
of proof instruction on the issues in the case (R. 505-561) (R.508,
509 are Appellee's instructions erroneously included in Appellants'
requests.)
Failure to request an instruction on the standard of
proof as applied to the case constitutes a waiver.

Rule 51, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure; Romrell v. W.W. Clyde Co., 534 P.2d 867
(Utah 1977).
In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
In order for a party to take advantage of a
failure to give a correct instruction, he must
have proposed such correct instruction and
excepted to the trial court's failure to give
it. Williamson v. Denver and R. G. W. R. Co.,
26 Utah 178, 487 P.2d 316; Morgan v. Pistone,
25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 839.
In the case of Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538
P.2d 1036 (Utah 1975) the main opinion ruled as follows at 538 P.2d
1037:
The appellant claims that the court erred in
not clearly instructing the jury that the
defendants had the burden of proof to show
probable grounds existed for detaining the
plaintiff.
The answer to that contention is that the
appellant did not tender a written instruction
to cover the matter.
This ruling was made in spite of the fact that Appellant orally
excepted to the burden of proof instruction given by the court.
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latter. The law of this state gives "every
person over the age of eighteen years, of sound
mind," the right to dispose of his property by
will as to him seems just and right. If this
right may be invaded simply because a court or
jury may not be able to agree with his
property, or because he has not made an
adequate allowance for a specific purpose, then
the right had better be abrogated entirely.
The dissent stated at 134 P. 558:
I think there is sufficient evidence to support
the special findings and verdict, and for that
reason dissent.
A reading of the Anderson case clearly

indicates a

standard of proof greater that a preponderance of the evidence in
proving the procurement of a document by undue influence.
The case of In Re Hansen's Will, 167 P. 256 (Utah 1917)
is not cited in Appellants' brief but is relied on heavily in the
Amicus Curiae brief in establishing preponderance of the evidence
as the standard of proof for undue influence in will contest.
The quotation appearing at p. 2 of the Amicus Curiae
brief misquotes the case.

The first complete sentence should

conclude as follows, "...[O]ought to be fairly established by a
preponderance of proof." instead of the misquote which reads,
"...[O]ought to be fairly established by a preponderance of the
evidence."
Also, the quotation at p. 2 of the Amicus Curiae brief
from the Hansen case is preceded by the following introductory
sentence at 157 P. 259:
With respect to the issue of undue influence,
however, the district court erred in holding
that the burden of proof rests on the
proponent. The great weight of authority is
24
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T:
If h e w a s .-i > .nd and di s posing mind and
memory w h e n he made it, t h e jury found that h e
w a s , then, under the law, he had the sole right
to choose the objects of his bounty, and it is
utterly immaterial whether what h e d i d is
approved o r disapproved b y either court or
jury
Tha t :i right i t is t o t h e duty of t h e
courts to protect and enforce, a n d n o t to
fritter it away b y entering a judgment which
perhaps reflects only their own v i e w s , or the
views of the jury, regarding the disposition
a testator shoi i] d have made of h i s property,
Th :i s i s a law case, and, in vi ew of that fact,
we have .no right, nor have w e the inclination
if w e had the right, t o interfere with t h e
findings of the jury in such a case where such
findings a r e based upon a n y substantial
evidence. We may, however, not disregard both
our duty and our oaths of office and permit a
judgment to stand, unless it is based upon
findings which are based upon some substantial
legal evidence. There is no such evidence in
this case upon the issue of undue influence,
and hence t h e findi ng of t h e jury is n o t
sanctioned b y law. A s a matter of law w e are
required, therefore, to set the findings and
judgment asj de
(emphasis added)
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The standard of proof adopted by the Utah Supreme Court
in determining whether a will was procured by undue influence is
set forth in the case of In Re Lavelle's Estate/ 122 Utah 253, 248
P.2d 372 (1952) at 375, 376 as follows:
To declare a will invalid because of undue
influence, there must be an exhibition of more
than influence or suggestion, there must be
substantial proof of an overpowering of the
testator's volition at the time the will was
made, to the extent he is impelled to do that
which he would not have done had he been free
from such controlling influence, so that the
will represents the desire of the person
exercising the influence rather than that of
the testator, (emphasis added)
To the same effect see In Re George's Estate, 112 P.2d 498, 499,
500 (Utah 1941); In Re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 P.2d 1106, 1112
(Utah 1938) •
The case of In Re Buttars' Estate, 261 P.2d 171 (Utah
1953) did nothing to the change the "substantial proof" cases
contrary to the assertion in the Amicus Curiae brief at p. 3. The
complete sentence from the Buttars case is as follows at 261 P.2d
172:
By this evidence the proponents made out a
prima facie case entitling the will to be
admitted to probate and it then became
incumbent on the contestants to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the testatrix
did not have a sound and disposing mind at the
time she executed the will or that she was
acting under fraud, menace or undue influence.
In Re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256.
The quoted

sentence deals with the burden of proof

and

the

reference to proof by a preponderance of the evidence refers only
to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and not to undue
26
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*w ^s states *** J^ w.^.J. Wills section 251 P. 1122 as

According to some authorities, a preponderance
of the evidence is necessary and sufficient to
establish undue influence in the execution of
a \ i J! II
I lowever, in numerous cases , it has
been said that undue influence, invalidating
a will, must be established by clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence by
compelling evidence, or by the manifest weight
of the evidence. In any event undue influence
in the execution of a will must be shown by
substantial evidence and evidence which merely
raises a suspicion or conjecti ire that the w i n
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was the product of undue influence
insufficient.... (emphasis added)

is

Standard of proof is defined in Black's Law Dictionary,
Abridged Fifth Edition, 1983 as follows:
Standard of Proof.
A statement of how
convincing the evidence must be in order for
a party to comply with his/her burden of proof.
The main standards of proof are proof beyond
a reasonable doubt (in criminal cases only),
proof by clear and convincing evidence, and
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the
standard

of

procurement

proof
of

for

a deed

establishing
is by

clear

undue
and

influence

convincing

in

the

evidence.

Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 248 P.2d 692 (Utah
1952).

The case of Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949)

contains the only extended discussion at P. 202-205 as to the
meaning of clear and convincing evidence to be found in Utah case
law.

Clear

and

convincing

evidence

is

finally

defined

in

Northcrest, Inc., supra, and Greener, as follows at 212 P. 2d 205:
But for a matter to be clear and convincing to
a particular mind it must at least have reached
the point where there remains no serious or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion.
"No serious or substantial doubt" as to the issue of
undue influence has to mean "substantial proof" which is clear and
convincing evidence.
Fraud and undue influence go together like a "horse and
carriage" and it is usual to see these two defenses asserted
together in contesting a will or setting aside a deed.

Again, the

Utah Supreme Court has adopted the standard of proof for fraud as
28
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'

conflicts

,

...•the burden of showing undue influence in
the execution of the deed is even greater than
that of showing incompetence.
It must be
established by clear and convincing evidence
that the grantee exercised a dominating
influence over the grantor.
The case of Blankenship v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 806
(Utah 1981) also appears to have adopted the preponderance of
evidence standard to establish the incompetency of a grantor. The
Court held at 622 P.2d 808:
Even though it may plausibly be contended that
the evidence would support a contrary finding,
we are not persuaded that there is no
reasonable basis in the evidence to support the
trial court's finding that at the time he made
the assignment to his wife, Dee E. Christensen
lacked mental capacity and that the assignment
was thus invalid and passed no interest in the
property to her.
This could not be by clear and convincing evidence as this standard
requires the evidence to be such that there is no serious or
substantial doubt as to the conclusion. Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952).
Thus, undue influence is undue influence whether it
presents itself

in a deed contest or a will contest.

Undue

influence, reduced to its simplest terms, is a substitution of the
will or the grantee-devisee for that of the grantor-testator.
In Re Lavelle's Estate, supra, it is stated:
[S]o that the will represents the desire of the
person exercising the influence rather than
that of the testator.
And Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978) says:
It must be established by clear and convincing
evidence
that the grantee
exercised a
dominating influence over the grantor.
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The classic test
general testamentary
capacity has three elements: to make a will,
one must be able to (1) identify the natural
objects of one's boundary and recognize one's
relationship to them, (2) recall the nature and
extent of one's property, and (3) dispose of
one's property understandingly, according to
a p] an formed i n one's mind,
Matter of Estate of Kesler, 7 02 P. 2d 86 (I It all i 1 9 85); Re Estate of
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judicial policy in favor of upholding the validity of a will as
being a once in a life-time, solemn document disposing of a
testator's entire estate. As a necessary corollary to this policy,
it is submitted that a higher standard of proof be necessary to set
a will aside, to wit: clear and convincing evidence.
Appellants argue at p. 27 of their brief in support of
the preponderance of evidence standard of proof for undue influence
that, "Deeds are effective on delivery without notice to third
parties.11

A will is also effective upon its date of execution

without notice to interested parties and is effective to vest title
in a devisee upon the death of testator and prior to probate
pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

75-3-101

and

under

certain

circumstances set forth in § 75-3-102 can be used to make transfers
of real property without the necessity of probate or notice to any
persons.
Appellants1 brief then states that "Deeds rarely, if
ever, show undue influence upon their face.11 The exact same thing
can be said with reference to wills.
Appellant's then argue at p. 28, "Third parties may rely
upon a recorded deed long before parties injured by undue influence
learn of the injury."

Third parties may also be put into the

position of relying upon the representations of a testator long
before they are injured by any alleged undue influence and so the
considerations are exactly the same.
The standard of proof to show undue influence in a will
contest is or ought to be by clear and convincing evidence as the
32

testator
|)MI

i 1 ii

y

ii I

is

dpad

( 111

and

i i mi 1 I I

qonc
In

:r

raised

and

-t-

in I i I

i lorir and convincing evidence *

The appeal

laliena^

_ ;t>

r^^1

ijsm.\:^c*

.: .uence

-1 ternat. i * -

judgment on the verdict should be affi rmed.
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Wendell P. Abies
Attorney for Appellee
536 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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J. Franklin Allred/ P.C./ #A0058
Attorney for Petitioner Gene J. Russell
321 South €00 East'
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-1990
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY/ STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OP MERYIN J. RUSSELL/

)
)

Deceased.

)

Consolidated With

)

GEORGIA J. RUSSELL/

)

Plaintiff/

)

v.

)

GENE. J. RUSSELL/ GENEIL P.
RUSSELL/ ADA J. RUSSELL and
HELEN RUSSELL GREEN/

)
)
)

JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

Defendants.

)

Probate No. P-86-052

Case No. 87-208

)

Judge Scott Daniels

Consolidated With

)

ADA J. RUSSELL/ HELEN J.
RUSSELL/ GENE RUSSELL and
GENEIL RUSSELL/ His Wife/
Plaintiffs/

)
)
)
)

v»

)

GEORGIA J. RUSSELL/

)

Defendant.

)

Case No. 87-213

)

ADDENDUM I
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Antenuptial Agreement dated

198-" '
Yes
No
r*

m^

nary

25

X
2ncellat;"n

o*

<?

NO

n
£

.

ec

D.

The Will dated November 9, 1983?
Yes

X

No
2.

Do

you

find

from

clear and convincing evidence

that the following documents were procured by the undue influence
of Georgia J. Russell?
A.

The Quit Claim Deed dated June 25, 1982?
Yes
No

B.

X

The

Cancellation

of

Antenuptial Agreement dated

August 14, 1982?
Yes
No
C.

X

The Cancellation

of

Antenuptial

Agreement dated

January 25, 1983?
Yes
NO

D.

X

The Will dated November 9, 1983?
Yes
No

3.
Georgia
Agreement

J.

X

Do you
Russell

dated

find a
signed

August

14,

preponderance of the evidence that
the

1982

Russell and at his direction?
Yes

Cancellation

X

No

3

of

Antenuptial

in the presence of Mervin J.

The jury made further findings as follows:
We the jurors in

the

above-entitled

Will of Mervin J, Russell to be

We

the

jurors

in

[ x

] Valid

[

]

[
[

Agreement to

the

x

[
[

the

] Valid
]

Invalid
matter

find the

Agreement dated August 14, 1982

unnctarized (Exhibit 30) to be

Acreement to

Invalid

above-entitled

Cancel Antenuptial

We the jurors in

find the

the above-entitled matter find the

Deed dated June 25, 1982 to be

We the jurors in

matter

] Valid
x

]

Invalid

above-entitled

matter

find the

Cancel Antenuptial Agreement dated January 25, 1983

notarized (Exhibit 3) to be

[ x
[

NOW, THEREFORE, based on

] Valid
]

Invalid

the foregoing

answers by the

;ury, the court does hereby ORDER judgment entered as follows:
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

1.

That certain AGREEMENT CANCELLING ANTENUPTIAL

AGREEMENT dated August 14, 1982, and having no notarial executed
thereon is hereby adjudged and decreed to be invalid.
2.

That certain AGREEMENT CANCELLING ANTENUPTIAL

AGREEMENT dated August 14, 1982, and having been notarized by
Edwin Skeen on January 25, 1983, is hereby adjudged and decreed
to be valid.

3.

That certain WILL dated November 9/ 1983/ and

being identified as the Last Will and Testiment of Mervin R.
Russell and bearing two signatures is adjudged and decreed to be
valid/ and is hereby admitted to probate in the above-entitled
Court.
4.

That certain QUIT CLAIM DEED/ a copy of which is

copied herein and identified as.

c

QUIT CLAIM DEED
MERVIN J. RUSSELL and GEORGIA J, RUSSELL, hit wife,
grantors, of Ophir, County of Tooele, State of Utah, hereby
QUIT CLAIM to MERVIN J, RUSSELL and CEORCIA J, RUSSELL, his
wife, as Joint tenants, Grantees, of Ophir, County of Tooele,
State of Utah, for the sum of Ten and no/100 Dollars, and other
good and valuable consideration, the following described tracts
of land in Tooele County, State of Utah;
East H of Northwest k\ South k of Northeast k of
Seceion 8, Twp, 6 South of Range 5 Wesc, S.L.M,
containing 160 acres;
ALSO?

Northeast k\ East H of Northwest k] Lots I and 2,
of Section 7, Twp. 7 South of Range 5 West,
S.L.M. Cont. 319.76 acres;

ALSO:

The Southeast of Northwest * and lots 2 and 3, of
Section 31, Twp. 5 South, Range 5 West, S.L.M,
except a tract of 8 acres com, at the Southeast
corner of Lot,3, thence North 10 chs; thence West
3 chs; thence'Souch 10 chs; thence East 8 chs to
beg, except right of way over 1.39 acres granted
to State Road Comm, containing 107.73 acres;

ALSO:

West k of Southwest k, Section 17, Twp, 6 South,
Range 5 Wesc, S.L.M, Cont. 80 ocres;

ALSO:

The South k of Seceion 2, Twp, 3 South, Range 4
West, S.L.M. Cone, 320 acres.

ALSO:

Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and Northeast k of Section 11,
twp 5 South of Range 4 West, S,L,M, Cont. 309,47
Acres,

Commencing 9.60 chains South of the Northwest
corner of Section 29, Township 5 South, Range 5
West; thence Norch 81° 15' East 20.20 chains;
thence Souch 5 chains; thence South 81°15' West
20.20 chains; thence North 5 chains to the place
of beginning,
PARCEL 1» The Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter and
Lots 2 and 3 of Section 31, Township 5 South, Range i West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
EXCEPTINC THEREFROM the following described property:
Commencing ac the Soucheasc corner oil said Loc 3 and running

(\

thence West 8 chains; chence Norch 10 chains; thence East 8
chains; thence South 10 chains to che point of beginning.
PARCEL 2: Tha South half of ScctionJi,
Township
Range 4 Vest. Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

3 South.

PARCEL 3; Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and the Northeast quarter of
Section XXi Township 5 South. Range 4 Vest. Salt Lake Bast and
Meridian,
PARCEL 4: The Vest half of the Northwest quarter; the
Northwest quarter of Che Souchwesc quarter of Seccion ^ 3 ,
Township 5 Souch, Range 4_H«* C » Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 5: The Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter of
Stction 21, Township j S.ouch, Range L.Wast, Salt Lake Bait and
Maridian; the Southwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of
Section JJ, Township J_5euch, Range 4 Vest. Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; Lots 1 and 2 ar.d che Souchwest quarter of the
.Vortheas: quarter :/ 5ec:::r. j.. Township $ South. Range 4 Vtsc .
Sa.r L<a,'<e 2as« ir.c ,^.-;::i.-..
PARCEL $1 The Black Shale Lode mining claim, Lot 3029,
containing 19.945 acres; Vest Shore, Selma, Sister Mary, Vast
Selma, Four o'clock, Esther, Alice, Maggie Kelly, Konast Dick,
Lola Barker and Black Sheep Lode mining claims, Lot No. 3164,
containing 184,22 acres; Douglas No. 1 and Douglas No, 2 lode
mining claims, Lot No, 31<«2, concaining 26,156 acres; Cold
Button, Buena Visca, Mary Jean No. 1, Mary Jean No. 2 and Mary
Jean Fraction lode mining claims, Loc No. 3231, containing
57.127 acres; Hecla, Hecla No, 1, Hecla No. 3, Hecla No. 3, and
Hecla No. 4 lode mining claims, Loc No. 3079, containing 66.27
acres; Syndicate No. I, Syndicace No. 2, Monopolist Nos. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3487,
containing 107.04 acres; Crannet Mountain lode mining claim,
Lot No. 3681, Quartet No, 1, Kansas Boy, Kansas Boy Fraction,
Kansas Boy No. 3 and Kansas Boy No. 4 lode mining claims, Lot
No. 3935, concaining 80.972 acres; Edna May, Louis No. 1, Louis
No. 2 and Louis No. 3 lode mining claims, Loc No. 3381,
containing 68,733 acres; Ivar.hoe, Coin, Albion and Try Again
lode mining claims, Loc No. 4192, concaining 64.376 acres; all
situated in Camp Floyd Mining District, in said County and
State; also Cold Bug No, 1, Cold Bug No, 3, Cold Bug No. 3 and
Cold Bug No. 4 lode mining claims, Lot No. 3356, concaining
55.20 acres; and Senator Stewart, Cedar Hill and Dolly Faunce
lode mining claims, concaining 61'. 9 21 acres, situaced in Ophir
Mining District in said Councy and Stace.
EXCEPTING land for highway known as Projecc Ho. DE-2 situated
in Louis Claim No, 3 of Mineral Survey No. 3381 in S e c t i o n ^
Township 6 South. Range 4_y.es t, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Said tract of land is 10'0'Teec wide, 50 feet on each side of
the center line of survey of said project. Said cencer line is
described as follows;
Beginning ac che incersection of the Southeasterly
boundary line of said Louis Claim No, 3 and said center line of
survey at Engineer's Station 7 7 3*23 1 which point is
approximately 225 feec North 63°20' East along said
Southeasterly boundary line from chfSouchwesc corner of said
Louis Claim No, 3; thence Northwesterly 243.3 feet along the

arc of a 1°00' curve to the left (Note:
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Tangent to said curve

at its point of beginning bears North 44*09* West) to the
intersection of said center line of survey at Engineer's
Station 775*66,3,and a 1*"* perpendicular to said center line
of survey, which-point'is approximately 70 feet North and
approximately 1383 feet Norch 46*35' West from the East quarter
corner of laid Section 4t as shown on the official map of said
roject on file in the office of the State Road Commission of
tah. Above described tract of l'and contains 0*56 of an acre,
of which 0.55 of an acre, more or less, is now occupied by tht
existing highway, Balance 0.01 of an acre, more or lass.

S

PARCEL 7:

Lots 1 and 4 in Block 16 of the St, John Town Plat.

PARCEL 8;
Flat.

Lots 4, 5, and 6 in Block 1 of the St. John Pasture
'
'

PARCEL 9; Beginning at the Southeast corner of the Southwest
quarter of Section ££, Township £..$.outh, Range JLJ^ost, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; running thence North 9,5 chains; thence
West 20 chains; thence Souch 9.5 chains; thence East 20 chains
to the point of beginning,
PARCEL 10? Beginning 15,28 chains North of the Southwest
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section JL9, Township JL
£outh, Range iJfciest, Sale Lake Base and Meridian; running
thence North 81°13' East 20.20.chains; thence North 10.24
chains; thence South 81°13' West 25,52 chains; thence South
8 a 43* East 10 chains; thence North 81°15' East 3.66 chains to
the point of beginning.
PARCEL 11; The Norcheasc quarter; the East half of the
Northwest quarter, an Locs 1 and 2 of Section JL, T o w n s h i p ^
South, Range 5^_West, Sal: Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 12i The East half of the Northwest quarter and the
South half of the Northeast quarter of Section JJ^ Township J.
.South, Range JL-Kest, Sale Lake Base and Meridian; the West half
^f the Southwest quarter of Seccion ^ , Township 6 South. Range
3 West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
PARCEL 13? The West half of the Northeast quarter; the South
half of the Northwesc quarter; Che West half of the'Southeast
quarter and the SOuchwest quarter of Seccion_lZ, Township JL
South, Range J.Jdtst,
Sale Lake Base and Meridian; West half of
the Northeast quarter and Northwest quarter of Section 20.
Township 7 South, Range 6 Wesc, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 14? The following described real property in Tooele
County, State of Ucah; The Golden Eagle Lode Mining claim
described as follows, co-wic: Mineral patent, Certificate No.
0638. Survey No, 5841, embracing a portion of Township J_&puth
of Range 4 West> Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in the Ophir "
Mining District in the Councy of Tooele, State of Utah?
Beginning at corner No. 1 marfced 1-5841, from which U.S.
Mineral Monument No. 1 bears South 78°53 ( West 1640.8 feet
distant; thence first course, South 72°43' East 2 feet
intersect line 4*5, an Cast line of Lot No. 162, the Grand
Culch Lode Claim; 152,4 feec intersect line 2*3 of Lot No.
15i*B, the Baltic Mill Site Claim, at South 16°40 l West 203.1
feet from corner No, 2; 600 feet to corner No, 2 marked 2-5841,
from which discovery cut bears North 26*10' West 416.9 feet
distant; thence, second course, North 19°48' East 1198,3 feet

•38

intersect line 2-3 of che Vile No, A, Lode Claim survey No,
5623 at South 76°55' Ease $80,3 feet from Corner Ho. 2; 1500
feet to corner No. 3, marked 3-5841; thence third course North
72°43' West 600 feec to corner No, 4 marked 4-5841; thence,
fourth course, South 19°48' West 248.5 feet intersect line 3-4
of the Nile No. 3 Lode Claim, Survey No. 5623 and line 1-2 of
laid Nile No. 4 Lode Claim, at Norch 6°24» East 297.4 feet and
97.4 feec from corners Nos. 3 and 2 respectively; 545.9 feet
intersect line 2*3 of said Nile No. 3 Lode Claim, ac Norch
76°53' Wesc 69,4 feec from corner No. 3; 927.9 feec incersect
line 2*3 of Survey No, 5535, che Bell No, 3 Lode Claim, ac
Norch 10° Ease 103,7 feet from corner No, 2, 1027.3 feec
intersect line 1-2 of said Survey No, 5535, at Norch 61 f 30'
Wesc 17.8 feec from Corner No. 2; 1298,2 feec incersecc line
1*2 of said Loc No. 151-B< ac Norch 71* 20' Wesc 141.4 fete from
corner No. 2; 1494.4 feec incersect said line 4-5 of Lot No.
162; 1500 feet to corner No. 1, the place of beginning;
expressly excepting and excluding from these presents all that
portion of the ground hereinbefore described, embraced in said
mining claims or Survey N'o, 5535; said Locs Nos 151*B and 162;
said Nile No, 3, Nile No. 4 Lode Claims Survey No. 5623 and
also all Chac porcion of said Golden Eagle vein or lode and of
all veins, lodes, and ledges chroughouc Cheir encire depch, che
tops or apexes of which lie inside of such excluded ground;
said survey No. 5841, excending 1500 feec in lengch along.che
Golden Eagle vein or lode; che premises herein granted,
containing 15.274 acres, more or less.
All of Lots 6, 7, and 8 and Che East 150 feet of Lot 9, Block
11, the East half of LoC 7, Block 12, all of Locs 2 Co 8
inclusive, Block 13; all of Locs 1 Co 9 inclusive, Block 14;
All of Locs 1 Co 9 inclusive, Block 15; all of Locs 2 Co 8
inclusive, Block 17; all of Locs 1 Co 9 inclusive, Block 18;
all of Locs 1 Co 10 inclusive, Block 19; all of Block 20; all
of Lot 9, Block 21, all of Block 22, except Lot 1; all of Block
23, except the West half of Lots 1, 2, and 3. All L O C J and
blocks described in this paragraph are located in Plat "A";
Ophir Survey, Togecher wich all wacer righes appurcenanc Co
"the foregoing pacenced mining claims and ocher propercy
including buC noc limited Co chose wacer righes awarded co
Annie Worching and Charles D. Daniels, described in paragraph
VI in Che decree of che District Courc of Tooele Councy, daced
December 20, 1919 in che case of 'Ophir Creek Wacer Company, a
corporacion, plaintiff vs. Ophir Kill Consolidaced Mining
Company, a corporacion, defendanc.
PARCEL 15;
The Norcheasc quarCe'r of Che Norcheast quarter of
Section J i j Township JLJ-Puch, Range JLWesc, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, excepcing road and portion conveyed co Warren and
Gertrude Penney,
PARCEL 16;
Locs 3, 4, and 5 of Section .4U Township JL0 Slouch,
JUnge _3 ffesti Salt Lake Base and Meridiani
PARCEL 17;
Lots 5, 6, 7, and 8 and the Southeast quarter of
the Southwest quarter of Sectionj5t> Township 10 South, Range.JL^
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 18;
Beginning ac the cencer of SecCion l&j Township 5
Souch, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, running
thence Norch 298 feec; chence Ease 1320 feec; chence Souch 30.5
feet; thence West 577,5 feec; chence Souch 247,5 feec; Chence
Wesc 742.5 ftec to the poinc of beginning.

.4*
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PARCEL 19;
The North half of Section li, Township 3 South.
Range 3 "Westt Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
"
PARCEL 20?
The Northwest quarter of Section J4j Township J.
South, R a n g e j West. Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
PARCEL 21:
The North half of the Northeast quarter; the
South half of the Norcheasc quarter of Section Xiu Township J.,
South, Range JLi^st, Sale Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 22;
The South half of the Norchwest quarter and the
Northwest quarter of che Souchwesc quarcer of Section .1.4,.
Township i_Squch. Range 6 Wesc, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 23;
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27
of Section JLflU T o w n s h i p 4 South. Range 3 West. Salt Lake Base
and Meridian. Lots 4 and 3; che Norch half of the Northeast
quarter, the Soucheasc quarcer of the Northeast quarter of
Section JJ^ Township 4 Souch, Range Litest, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; also the Soucheasc quarcer of the Southeast quarter
of SectionJJ, Township 4 Souch, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base
and MeridianT
"
"
PARCEL 24;
The South half of the Souchwest quarter of
Section 12, Township 5 5 p u c h , Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian?""
PARCEL 23;
The-East half of Che Southwest quarter; the
Southwest quarter of che Souchwesc quarter of Section^JJL
Township 5 Souch, Range ^ J ^ s t , Sale Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 26;
S e c t i o n ^ Township J, South, Range i^West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 27;
East half of che NorChwest quarter; the Northeast
quarter of the Souchwesc quarcer; Locs 1, 2, and 3 of Section
j j , Township 3 Souch, Range 4 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 28;
Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and che East half of the West
half and the West half of che Ease half of Section_7, Township
3 South. Range 3 Wesc, Sale Lake Base and Meridian.
PARCEL 29;
All of SectionJ^, Township j_S.ouch, Range
of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

JuHftt

Containing 7017.32 acres, more or less.
Subject to existing rights of way,
TOGETHER with the following wacer rights as more fully
described in the accion encicled Ophir Creek Waeer Company vs.
Ophir Kill Consolidaeed Mining Company, daced December 20,
1919, in the Districc Courc in and for Tooele Councy:
The water rights decreed Co Annie Worthing in paragraph VI of
said decree being a right for 10,000 gallons of wacer each 24
hours from the pipeline of Ophir Hill Consolidaeed Mining
Company and 23/100 c.f.s, from che nacural flow of Ophir Creek
all for the irrigation of Coiden Eagle Lode Mining Claim Survey
5841.
ALSO together with all stock water rights used in the operation
of this livestock unit.
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Hecla, Hecla No, 1, Hecla No. 2, Hecla No. 3 and Hecla No. 4,
V,$. Survey 3079, containing 66.240 acres, more or lest.
Black Shale, U.S. Survey 3029, containing 19.945 acres, more or
less.
Douglas No. 1, \J,S. Survey 3142, containing 27,830 acres, more
or less.
Buena Vista, Cold Button, Mary Jean No. 1, Mary Jean No, 2,
Mary Jean Fraction, U.S. Survey 3231, containing 57.127 acres,
more or less.
Granite Mountain, (aka Crannec Mt. No. 4,) Quartet No, 1,
Kansas Boy, Kansas Boy Fraccion, Kansas Boy No. 3 and Kansas
Boy No. 4, U.S. Survey 3681 (should be Survey No. 3935), 80.973
acres.
Syndicate No, I, Syndicate No. 2, U.S. Survey 3487 and
Monopolist Nos 1 to 8 inclusive, U,S. Survey 3487, containing
107,40 acres,
Ivanhoe, Albion, Coin and Try Again, U,S, Survey 4192, 64.376
acres,
West Shore, Selma, Vest Selma, Sister Mary, Four O'clock,
Alice, Esther, Maggie Kelly, Honest Dick, Lola Barker and Black
Sheep, U.S. Survey 3164, containing 184,27 acres.
NfcJj of NE
less 3.09 ac, at road Comm. " Also 6.91 ac. to
Warrant & Gertrude Fenney. All in Ser. 15, T. 5 8., R. 5 W.
Lots 3, 4, 5, Sec. A, T. 10 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M, cont. 96.58
acres,
Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, SE
cont. 170,04 acres.

o.f SW*, Sec 5, T. 10 S, R. 5 W. S.L.B,

Beg. at center of Sec.
, T. 5
, R.
1320 ft.; — 50Jj ft. W.~T77i* ft; S,
~
to beginning, cont. 4.13 acres.

W.,
238 ft; C.
ft; tT
ft;

ot
of
Stc
°* HE i SJ* ot N H _ IE
' 17 » T*
7 T . , R7"T"W,, S.L.M. cone. A00 acres.
W
of NE , NW
of Sec. 20, T, 7 S , , R. 6 W. S,L.M. cont.
Z75 acres.
ft °* NW t L-. of N _ of Sec. 13, T. 5 S,, R. 5 W. , S.L.M.
cone. 240 acres,
w

NW

of Sec 14, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M, cont. 160 acres,

N
of NE , S. of NE
cont. 160 acres.

of Sec. 14, T, 5 S,f R. 5 W,, S.L.M.

SW
of NW t N
of SW t Sec. 14, T. 6 S., R.
cont, 120 acres.
Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, A 27.
S,, R. 3 W,, S.L.M, Lots 4 and 5;
NE ; SB
31 T, 4 S., R. 3 W. , S.L.M. SE _ , SE
Sec. 25
4 W., S.L.M, Con. in all 546.30 acres,
5

of NE

8% of S

6 W.,
Sec. 30, T. 4
NE ; Sec.
T T 7 S., R.

, Sec, 13, T. 5 S,, R. 5 W., SL.M. cone, _

acres.

, Sec. 12, T, 3 S,, R. S^W., S.L.M, cone. 80 acres.

of SW , SW
cont. 120 acres,

of SW

Sec. 11, T. 5 S., R. 5 W., S.L.M.
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and having been recorded on July 6, 1987, in the office of the
Tooele County Recorder as Entry No. 010641, in Book 258, pages 220224 is hereby adjudged and decreed to be invalid.

DATED this j T ^ day of

VM^V*-\*.

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Judgment on Verdict was hand delivered to:

Wendell P. Abies, 536

East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
DATED this £ ^

day of March, 1990.

'. Franklin Allred
attorney for Petitioner
Gene J. Russell
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THF COURT:

Did you want to make a proffer of

testimony, Mr. Allred, as to what this witness will say?
MR. ALLRED:
little ground work.

Your Honor T will, if I may lay a
I contacted the questioned document

examiner in November, as she indicated, and at that time,
the court will recall, I did not have any corrections to
Georgia Russell's deposition, so I provided her with all of
what v/e thought would be evidence in this case, and I
obtained opinions on a number of items.
First that that signature on that August 14th
unnotarized agreement cancelling the antenuptial agreement:
was not ;4er Russell's signature, and it toolc us a lot of
exhaustive effort to find that out.
Secondly, that the characteristics inherent in
that signature, if I am correct here, indicate that it was a
person disguising their own handwriting.

And thirdly, there

are additional documents, all of which I obtained from Mr.
SKeenfs files.

No document here came from anywhere else but

Fd Sfceen's files.

There were no oojectionns filed to the

foundation of them.

Other documents are relevant in maxing

the comparisons and the conclusion that she has made, and so
we have a witness whose testimony I believe we are entitled
to offer.
THE COURT:

Hold on a second.

She is going to

1

testify that the August 14th document was not signed by Mer

2

Russell; that it was signed by someone who was attempting to

3

disguise their own handwriting, and the other documents are

4

just comparison documents which she used to make this

5

conclusion?

6

iVR. ALLRED:

Yes.

One of them is —

we have a

7

page of Georgia Russell^ handwriting, and we said in the

3

exhibits we were going to bring

9

THE COURT:

10
11
12
13
14
15

MR. ALLRED:

THE COURT:
isn't relevant.

—

that we needed sufficient samples,

Those other documents, what they say

The point there is the handwriting style?

MR. ALLRED:

The handwriting style.

We are just

looking at her analysis from a standpoint of an expert.
THE COURT:

17

MR. ALLRED:

19

Okay.

and we have that sufficient sample, which is that document.

15

13

—

Fine.
All these other documents, the deed

and cancellation of the antenuptial agreement.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All we are looking for is

20

handwriting style; doesnft matter what they are.

21

be love letters for all you care?

22

MR. ALLRED:

23

THE COURT:

They could

That is correct.
Hold on.

*Tow are you going to — .Mr.

24

Abies, are you going to contest either of those two facts:

25

Either that this document of August 14th was not signed by

1

Merv Russell or that it was signed by someone attempting to

2

disguise their own handwriting?

3

MR. ABLES:

It was signed by Georgia Russell on

4

August 14th, we stipulate to that.

And I think that

5

question of disguising, I don't think that's relevant at

6

all.

She has admitted she signed it.

7

THE COURT:

You are not going to

8

MR. ABLES:

Let me —

9

mean this —

—

Mr. Skeen's deposition —

I

I don't think you need a real swift document

10

examiner for that because he handed this same document to Ed

11

Skeen, who is about 84 years old; asked him if —

12

handwriting it was.

13

me."

14

in whose

He says, "It looks like Georgia's to

THE COURT:

You aren't going to contest, then,

15

that it appears to have been written by someone who was

16

disguising their testimony.

17
13
19

MR. ABLES:

You won't agree to that, right?

I think —

well, I don't know whether

that is relevant or not.
THE COURT:

It is relevant.

It i3 clearly relevant.

My question is do you

20

agree to it?

She is going to say

21

looks like someone disguising their handwriting.

22

no question it is relevant.

23

I will overrule that objection.

24

tnat, then she doesn't need to testify.

25

we can get on with it.

There is

If your objection is relevancy
If you will stipulate to
So you just say and

MR. ALLRED:

I wonder if I might say one other

2

thing, your Honor.

3

back to the Rule 30(e) dealing with filing of depositions.

4
5

Here's why it is important.

THE COURT:
important.

I have already ruled that it is

That's okay.

6

MR. ALLRED:

7

THE COURT:

3

donft need to talk me into it.

9
10

This comes

That's okay?
I ruled in your favor on that.

You

I just need to know whether you agree to it, Mr.
Abies.

11

MR. ABLES:

All right.

We will stipulate to that.

12

THE COURT:

What we are going to tell the jury,

13

then, is that you will agree that she examined the

14

documents.

When?

15

THE WITNESS:

io

THE COURT:

17

When did she examine them?

When did

she give you her conclusion?

18

MR. ALLRED:

19

THE WITNESS:

20

November.

I think we got the conclusion
It was November.

—

November, but I am

sorry, but I don't have the date on the top of my head.

21

THE COURT:

November of 19

22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:

—

'88.
At that time she gave you her

24

conclusions, which are that, number one, the August 14th

25

signature of Mer Russell was not written by him; and

secondly, that in her opinion it was written by someone
attempting to disguise their own handwriting*
MR* ABLES:

That's right*

MR. ALLRED:

Your Honor, there is additional

testimony.
THE COURT:

And that is*

MR* ALLRED:
purporting —

That two of those documents

an addition purporting to be his signature,

which shows, I thinkr a scheme or a plan, were not authored
by him, and those document are exhibits number
THE WITNESS:

—

My testimony is that Mr. Russell did

not sign the agreement cancelling the antenuptial agreement
on 8-^4-82, which i3 known to me as Q-l.
authorize —

He did not

author a release that was done on 1-12-84, and

he did not author a grazing permit signed after his death
that was executed on 1-12-87.
MR. ABLES:

Well, those agreements —

all those

things are irrelevant and immaterial to the determination of
his mental capacity and
THE COURT:
1-12-84.

—

Let's 3ee those two documents, the

What are they again?
MR. ABLES:

One of them is posthumous.

THE WITNESS:

The documents I say were not signed

by Mr. Russell are Q-lf 2, 3 and Q-4.
THE COURT:

I need more of the signature.

I need

1

the documents.

Have you got the documencs there on

2

m.

3

MR. ABLES:

4

ALLRED:

I think they are

—

—

We stipulate she signed those two.

She will stipulate she signed those two.

5

THE COURT:

Now, are you also going to testify

5

that these documents were also signed by someone attempting

7

to disguise their handwriting?

8
9

THE WITNESS:
attempted signing.

10

I am not going to say that was an

Cnly Q-l was, in my ooinion.

THE COURT:

Well, you can stipulate to that toof

11

than.

On document August 14th, she will say that it wa^ not

12

signed by Mervin Russell, and that that document was signed

13

by someone in her opinion who wa3 attempting to disguise

14

their handwriting; that the document is dated January 26,

15

'87, and wa3 it January 12th, f84?

16

THE WITNESS:

17

signed by Mr. Russell.

lb

MR. ALLRED:

19

THE WITNESS:

20
21
22
23

January 12, f84 and 1-12-8 7 were not

1-12-87.
Yes.

Don't you mean 1-26-87?

I guess I looked at the 12

that day.
THE COURT:

Okay.

The other one was the f84

document, was what?
THE WITNESS:

I have 1-12-84 on that.

Tt was a

24

release that was in with a number of papers that were

25

stapled together.

1

THE COURT:

Those documents were not signed by

2

I4ervin Ru3sell, but in her opinion they were not signed by

3

someone attempting to disguise their own handwriting*

4

MR. ALLRED:

I say this reluctantly, your Honor.

5

I donft think I should be in a position where I am forced

6

into a stipulation.

7

examiner concluded and related to me in advance of the time

8

that the deposition was filed, that Georgia signed the

9

signature on Q-1 or the agreement cancelling the antenuptial

10

The other facts that the document

release.

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

Do you stipulate to that?

14

MR. ABLES:

Antenuptial agreement; that Georgia

16

THE COURT:

Yes.

17

MR. ABLES:

No.

lb

THE COURT:

You mean the document cancelling the

15

19
20

The antenuptial?

antenuptial agreement?
MR. ABLES:
THE COURT:

22

.MR. ALLRED:

23

LMR. A3LES:

25

Yes.

signed it?

21

24

Is that right?

Which day is that?
The August 14 document.
August 14 f 1982.
Well, there is only one document we

are talking about.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR, ALLRED:

We had knowledge of that prior to the

time they changed their answers in the deposition.

And

prior to the time 3he changed her answers in the deoosicion
they had knowledge we had a questioned document
THE COURT:
that*

—

I am not going to characterize I C liice

I am going the characterize it in terms of when she

did tell you, which was November 1983.

You can show later

when the deposition was corrected if you want.
MR. ALLRED:

Are we certain on that time?

THE WITNESS:

I don't believe so until we got this

other handwritten letter from Louise.
THE COURT:

When did you tell him that?

THE WITNESS:

When did I come to your office?
January or so of f 89.

MR. ALLRED:
THE WITNESS:

Do you recall the exact date I

picked up another packet of documents?
six at that time.

There were Drobaoly

I do not have them with me, but I did

make copies of them.
THE COURT:

Well what's your best escimate of when

that was?
MR. ALLRED:

I have got a receipt on it nere, I

thinfc.
THE COURT:

If you have got something that

refreshes her memory, that is good.
THE WITNESS:

It's been this winter, though.

MR. ALLRED:

I think it was right around the time

of the pre-trial.
THE COURT:

I want her testimony.

THE WITNESS:

This is the what I am talking about.

MR. ALLRED:

Right.

When you picked those up.

Did you keep your copy of the receipt?
THE WITNESS:

John, I probably did and T.don't

know if I have it with me.
MR* ALLRED:

She wrote me a receipt for the

document.
THE WITNESS:
MR. ALLRED:

And he made a copy.
And I got a copy.

Did you find it?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:

Now, do you remember —

Will you

resume the witness stand?
THE WITNESS:
MR. ALLRED:

I am sorry.
You can tell him.

THE COURT:

Now, my question is, do you remember

when it was you told him that?
THE WITNESS:

I picked up that particular document

on 5-11-89.
THE COURT:

What I want to know, when you told Mr.

Alired that you thought it was Georgia's signature.
THE WITNESS:

It would have been 5-11 or 5-12 of

•39 f then*

That Georgia in fact had authored our Q-l, which

is the cancellation,
THE COURT:

So was about ten or 12 days ago?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes*

Okay*

5-11 or 5-12 of f S9.

Okay.

Thatfs what her testimony will be*
MR. ALLRED:

They learned about our document

examiner on the 16th of May and their changes in answers
where delivered to me on the 18th of May, just one day
before our final pre-trail.
THE COURT:

You can establish that some other way.

This witness doesn't know that.

You can establish that

later, so long as you can get in when she told you about the
document.
Will you stipulate to all of that, Mr, Abies?
MR, ABLES:

May I hear it one more time?

T think

it is brief, I believe.
THE COURT:

Okay.

In November of 1988 —

this

witness examined some documents in November of 1988.

She

gave the opinion to Mr. Allred that the August 14th document
was not signed by Mervin Russell in her opinion.

Secondly,

that it was signed by some other person attempting to
disguise their own handwriting.

That on May 11th or 12th of

1989 she came to the conclusion and indicated to Mr. Allred
that the person who had signed it was Georgia Russell.

And

1

secondly that there are two other documents which she looked

2

at, one dated January 12th, 1984 —

3

know?

4

THE WITNESS:

5

MR. ALLRED:

6

Plaintiffs exhibit

—

It is in a packet in Plaintiffs1 57,

THE COURT:

Well, take it out and have it marked

The whole packet doesnft need to be in.

8

separately.

9

it marked a different number.

10

MR. ALLRED:

I think maybe —

Have

could we keep it an

integral document; put 57-A on it, as part of it?
Thatfs fine.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ALLRED:

14

they are all relevant that way.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ALLRED:

17

Do you

your Honor, and it is identified as a release.

7

11

exhibit what?

I hate to lose them because I think

57-A is fine.
Plaintiffs 57-A is a integral part of

57.

IB

THE COURT:

19

MR. ALLRED:

20

THE COURT:

And January 26, '87 document is what?
Yes.
50?

That's 60.

Those documents were signed

21

were —

were not signed by Mervin Russell but in her

22

opinion they were not signed by someone attempting to

23

disguise their handwriting.

24

MR. ABLE3:

That's right, your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

Let's call the jury back in.

—

1

MR* ABLES:

In addition to that we stipulated

—

2

we did stipulate in addition to the opinion of the examiner

3

—

4

August 14th of 1982, whatever number it bears, and also she

5

signed exhibits 57 and 60.

we stipulated that Mrs. Russell signed the document dated

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. ALLRED:

Okay.
I donft think that should be part of

8

the stipulation.

9

stipulating to the testimony as accuratef and not get in

10

T think it should show that they are

there to start out making their excuses.

11

THE COURT:

I guess that's right.

12

MR. ABLES:

We aren't going to enter testimony

13

MR. ALLRED:

14
15
16
17

I am sure you are going to.

—

You have

got all that right.
THE COURT:

You can put that in.

That's not part

of this witness's testimony.
MR. ALLRED:

Thank you, your Honor.

Okay.

13

Well, it is time for a recess, anyway.

19

to bring them back and let them go on a recess, or just take

20

a few minutes.

21
22
23

THE COURT:

I don't know whether

Let's take five minutes more.

We

will call them in at five minute to four and proceed then.
MR. ALLRED:

Before your Honor leaves, I wonder if

24

we might have a finding for the record for the witness's

25

curriculum vitae.

She did qualify as an expert witness in

this court.
TKS COURT:

Any oojection, Mr. Abies?

MR. ABLES:

None.

THE COURT:

That will be fine.

Okay.

We will be in recess for five minutes.
(Short recess taken.)
it

it

if

it

it
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